We can’t count the number of times in the last week we’ve heard analysts worry about “what the Fed might know that we don’t.” In the words of John McEnroe, “You cannot be serious!”
Bulls who fashion themselves as contrarians argue that the public is nowhere near as infatuated with the stock market as they were in the late 1990s. It may come as a shock to our readers, but we agree with them.
Based largely on the bearish trends in our monetary and liquidity measures, we were correctly negative on stocks throughout most of 2018. It’s therefore especially painful for us that 2019’s market rebound has been credited almost entirely to the “pivot” in most of those measures.
After last year’s spectacularly successful pivot following the December 2018 plunge, the thinking is that future rate hikes are the bull market’s only threat. Perhaps that will be the case; the belief is certainly well-supported by postwar U.S. economic history, but it also reveals a shocking lapse in short-term memory.
Among six major monetary gauges, five are now graded bullish, compared with just three a few months ago, and zero at the end of 2018.
With all the excitement over the Fed’s shift in rhetoric and the excellent subsequent market action, there’s a danger of losing sight of the broader cyclical backdrop for U.S. stocks. Remember, the economy is still operating beyond government estimates of its full-employment potential, and it’s not as if the Fed has actually eased policy—as it did successfully at a similar late-cycle juncture in the fall of 1998 and (ultimately unsuccessfully) in the summer of 2007.
The Fed has long claimed itself to be “data dependent” while providing less and less information on those data points it considers most relevant. We can’t know what’s on that list, but we certainly know what isn’t: the ISM Manufacturing Composite, which (prior to the current cycle) provided an excellent gauge of the Fed’s policy bias.
We don’t think the current stock market upleg is over.
In recent years the Fed has been more forthright than ever about the importance of the wealth effect as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy. But this (or any) policy effect hardly exists in a vacuum, and the Fed would do well to recognize that stock market swings have played an increasingly important role in the country’s fiscal balance.
We considered the launch of the QE tapering program in January 2014 as the formal onset of the Fed’s tightening campaign, and that view seemed to be on the mark when High Yield bonds, and then stocks, unraveled over the next couple of years—although the final losses in the DJIA and S&P 500 fell short of what we expected.
One never appreciates what he or she has until it’s gone. In our case, during the many years it was freely available, we failed to appreciate the zero interest rate. Now that it’s gone, we already feel pressured to join a game where we (and very few others) have any edge: Fed-watching. Our real edge is that we recognize this.
Allow us to put forth yet another theory for this season’s plummet in NFL television ratings: Fed watching is back!
Over the last eight years, policymakers around the world have held interest rates at unimaginably low levels, run persistently large fiscal deficits, and (in some cases) engaged in outright money-printing via quantitative easing programs.
We have mentioned a number of times that China had experienced a very unpleasant “second-hand” tightening due to its peg to the dollar. Its trade competitiveness has suffered tremendously. With a weaker dollar the Chinese Yuan can re-gain some of its competitiveness while maintaining its peg to the dollar. A rare win-win in today’s convoluted world of finance.
As quantitative investors, the disciplines of the numbers trump stories—even our own. But we’re struck that the stories depicted by our Major Trend Index and other market tools over the past two years are entirely logical and sequential. Unfortunately these stories rhyme with those of past market cycles.